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NOTES
The Foreign Ownership Disclosure Act of 1989: Do You Know
Who Owns Your Piece of the Rock?
Since 1980 there has been an explosion in the amount of foreign invest-
ment, both direct and indirect, in the United States. In 1988 the
United States experienced its first foreign direct investment deficit.I "Al-
ready, foreign buyers have acquired such... companies as CBS Records,
Purina Mills, Brooks Brothers, Celanese, Doubleday, Smith-Corona,
Hardee's, Firestone, Pillsbury, and Smith & Wesson." 2 Two years ago,
the Japanese real estate company, Mitsubishi Estate Company, an-
nounced that it had secured a fifty-one percent interest in the Rockefeller
Group, Inc., which owns, among other entities, Rockefeller Center and
Radio City Music Hall, American landmarks in the heart of New York
City.3 Through its ownership in the Rockefeller Group, Mitsubishi will
count among its tenants: General Electric Company, National Broad-
casting Company, Time Warner, Price Waterhouse and Morgan Stan-
ley.' The purchase cost Mitsubishi Estate Company $846 million.5 This
is just one example of recent investment by foreign investors. 6
1 The United States invested $327 billion in foreign countries while foreign countries invested
$329 billion in the U.S. Foreign Investment in the US: Hearing on S289 and 9856 Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce &ience and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1989) (statement
of Sen. Harkin) [hereinafter Hearing].
2 135 CONG. REc. E1366, E1367 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1989) (quoting Anderson, Is Americafor
Sale?, PARADE, Apr. 16, 1989).
3 Plain Dealer, Oct. 31, 1989, at 1-D, col. 1. See also Update." Some Trophy, REALTOR NEWS,
Nov. 6, 1989, at 1. Other Japanese investment in New York includes the Exxon Building, bought by
Mitsui Foundation for $610 million; the ABC Headquarters, bought for $175 million, and the Tif-
fany Building, bought for $94 million. Lambert & Howard, US. Real Estate: The Japanese Factor,
PROB. & PROP. Nov./Dec. 1987, at 29, 31.
4 Japanese Buy New York Cachet with Deal for Rockefeller Center, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1989,
at 1, col. 1.
5 IdL; Plain Dealer, supra note 3.
6 Foreign investment has worked its way into many other business opportunities that touch our
lives.
For the average American, the result [of the foreign investment] is that today many
'American' brands no longer are. Carnation is now owned by the Nestle group of Switzer-
land, Standard Oil of Ohio belongs to British Petroleum of the United Kingdom. We shop
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With the sudden increase in foreign investment, an alarming prob-
lem has come to the attention of Congress. There is no systematic
method for registering foreign investment. Without such a method, it is
nearly impossible to determine who owns what; the United States gov-
ernment does not know how much of America is owned by foreign inves-
tors. Such ignorance could be potentially dangerous. The Foreign
Ownership Disclosure Act of 1989 (FODA) was a bill before Congress,
which would force foreign investors to reveal basic information to the
government.
The foreign direct investment (FDI) in this country normally entails
the purchase of equity either in a business or in real estate. Much of this
note will examine some of the various types of FDI and why there might
be reasons for concern. But an operative definition is important before a
close study of the subject may begin. Globally, there is no set definition
for foreign direct investment. The most common definition is where "a
foreign person or company obtains direct or indirect ownership of at
least ten percent of controlling equity."7 This has generally been inter-
preted to mean ten percent of the voting securities.' The reason for fo-
cusing on voting securities is that they allow an investor to express her
voice in the management of the corporation. Though ownership of vot-
ing securities does not necessarily imply possession of distributional
rights, the two often go together. Ownership of voting securities does,
however, imply the right to control, at least in part, the equity or assets
of a corporation. The International Monetary Fund points to that ele-
ment of supervisory control when it characterizes foreign direct invest-
ment as an "investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the
investor's purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of
the enterprise. ' These definitions also apply to real property holdings.10
Real estate, in fact, is quite a popular investment opportunity.1 As will
at Supermarkets owned by Germans (A&P), and when we buy our hamburgers from
Hardee's, the answer to the question "Where's the beef... from?" is Canada.
135 CONG. REC., S854, S855 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
7 H. PONIACHEK, DIREcr FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNrrED STATES xi (1986).
8 Foreign Investment in US: Real Estate: Federal and State Laws Affecting the Foreign Investor
- An Update, 16 REA. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 465, 466 (1981).
9 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT: GLOBAL
TRENDS AND THE U.S. ROLE 171 (1988) (quoting the International Monetary Fund definition)
[hereinafter 1131].
10 Id. at 1.
11 Almost one half of the real estate in downtown Los Angeles is believed to be controlled by
foreign investors. 134 CONG. REc. H9581, H9589 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Rep. Bry-
ant). Foreigner investors are believed to own thirty-nine percent of Houston. Id It is thought that
one-third of all available office space in Minneapolis is owned by Canadians, while "Toronto's
Reichman brothers own 8 percent of Manhattan's office space." 135 CONG. REC., supra note 2.
Foreign investors own over 1,900,000 acres of the State of Maine, mostly woodland for their pulp
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be shown, though, these definitions are not concrete and can vary with
the different types of ownership.
There are many reasons for the increased investment. The weak
American dollar, 2 the openness of U.S. markets, the fear of future barri-
ers to the American markets, and strong economic growth have been
among the most motivating. 3 Since the Japanese have recently in-
creased their investment in the United States, much attention has been
focused on them. Because of their industrial growth, the Japanese have
become very wealthy and have earned vast sums of money by virtue of
their exports.' 4 Given their emphasis on saving and investing money, the
Japanese have looked to this country for investment opportunities.
While cries of prejudice have been raised'" and are occasionally valid,16
and paper operations. Study: Foreigners Own 1% of Acreage, Chicago Trib., May 1, 1989, at 3, col.
1. That figure is approximately twice of what is owned by foreign investors in California. Id
12 When Sony bought CBS records for $2 billion, it "represented the same amount of yen as
would have amounted to $1 billion two years earlier." Rohatyn Says U.S Should Scrutinize Foreign
Investment in U.S., CoRp. FIN. WK, Feb. 1, 1988, at 8.
13 11DI, supra note 9, at 38. IDI lists eight reasons for increased foreign investment in the U.S.
* There is a growing recognition among foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) of the
size of the United States market and a perception of the United States as a "safe haven" of
political stability and economic strength in a turbulent world.
e Large foreign multinational firms are becoming increasingly confident of their ability to
compete with U.S. firms in the United States.
a Concern about possible increased U.S. protectionism has encouraged foreign establish-
ment or acquisition of U.S. facilities to avoid prospective trade barriers.
* Strong economic growth in the United States has improved the earnings of many domes-
tic firms, making them attractive for foreign acquisition.
e Corporate restructuring also has increased the number of domestic candidates available
for foreign takeovers, as enterprises have spun off some divisions in the process of corpo-
rate reorganization.
* Relatively high U.S. interest rates, compared with rates abroad, motivated U.S. affiliates
to reinvest their earnings and, to the extent possible, to borrow from their foreign parents
rather than borrow in U.S. financial markets.
* Foreign investors were actively pursued by individual state and municipal governments,
especially in the South.
* The recent depreciation of the U.S. dollar against most leading foreign currencies re-
duced the foreign-currency cost of acquiring U.S. companies, building new facilities and
expanding existing ones.
14 "Basically, the VCR's and the Toyotas are coming back." Foreign Investors Step Into More
Active Roles, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1988, at AS, col. 1.
15 It is instructive to note that "when Irving Bank Corp. of New York this week decided to sell
51 percent of its stock to a foreign company, Banca Commerciale Italiana of Roma, it caused hardly
a ripple, even though if the deal goes through, Irving would be the largest U.S. bank under foreign
control. But imagine the ideological brouhaha if control of the nation's 24th largest bank were to
pass into the hands, say, of the Fuji Bank of Tokyo!" Rowen, A Trade Bill We Could Live Without,
Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1988, at A21, col. 1.
16 Sixty-five percent of Americans would disapprove of a U.S. bank being sold to the Japanese
and sixty-one percent think that Japanese imports should be restricted. In 1982, a Chinese-Ameri-
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when Japanese investment is scrutinized, its rapid pace in the United
States has at least drawn attention to the scope of all foreign direct in-
vestment. 7 If this trend continues, Japan should surpass Great Britain
and the Netherlands as the largest foreign investor in the United States.'
There is no broad umbrella requirement in the United States that
compels foreign nationals who invest in American business or real estate
to disclose their identity." Although twenty different governmental enti-
ties collect data on foreign investment in the United States, the informa-
tion is either insufficient or flawed.' 0 As a result, the United States
government does not know who owns America. On January 3, 1989,
United States Congressman John Bryant (D-Texas) introduced FODA,
also known as H.R. 5, into the House of Representatives.2 "[FODA]
addresses the critical need to establish a centralized and reliable source of
data regarding the rapid increase in foreign ownership of U.S. farms,
banks, factories, corporations, and Government securities."22 On Janu-
ary 31, 1989, Senator Thomas Harkin (D-Indiana) introduced the same
bill in the Senate, stating that "[tihe purpose of this bill is to require the
systematic registration of most foreign-owned interests in our country.
2 3
Under FODA, foreign nationals owning more than five percent of a
U.S. business or real estate valued at five million dollars or more would
be required to disclose to the government their "address; identity; nation-
ality;... industry; the date the interest was acquired; the percentage of
the interest and its market value; and the name[,] location and industry
of the U.S. property."'24 Examination of FODA must be done by first
understanding the reasons for creating such a broad law. When these
concerns are established, an accurate test of foreign direct investment
can was beaten to death in front of a blue collar bar in Detroit. His assailants thought he was
Japanese. Smith, Fear and Loathing of Japan, FORTUNE, Feb. 26, 1990, at 51.
17 135 CONG. REc., supra note 2, at E1367.
18 Yoneyama, U.S. House Passes Foreign Ownership Disclosure Bill, Kyodo News Service, Oct.
6, 1988 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Archiv. fie) (Great Britain and the Netherlands are the first and
second largest investor countries in the United States, respectively).
19 Id
20 The" data is often considered confidential, restricted to only the agency that collected the
data. Other agencies (or even the public), which could use the raw data for different purposes, may
not have access to it, thus making the usefulness of the data very limited. Other flaws include a two-
year lag before the data is finally published. The data collected often has insufficient specifies, thus
reducing its usefulness, and, when it is collected, there is no central repository for storage of it. The
adequacy of the reporting techniques has also been assailed. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFmcE,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: FED. DATA COLLECTION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S., 1-2
(Oct. 1989) [hereinafter FOREIGN INVESTMENT] (introductory letter from Mr. Allan Mendelowitz,
Director of Trade, Energy, and Finance Issues, to Sen. Ernest Hollings and Rep. John Dingell).
21 H.R. 5, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. 1, E4 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989).
22 Id
23 S. 289, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 101 CONG. REC. 8, S854 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1989).
24 135 CONG. REc., supra note 21.
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needs to be created. With such a test, the government would be able to
collect the data it truly needs.
I. THE HISTORY OF ALIEN LANDHOLDING LAWS
IN THE UNITED STATES
Before examining the current condition of laws affecting foreign di-
rect investment in the United States, it is important to have an under-
standing of the history of alien landholding laws. By appreciating the
descent of laws that restrict alien ownership, it will be easier to place
modem laws in their proper context.
The United States' first laws were brought from England with
America's first settlers; U.S. alien landholding laws have their origins
firmly rooted in the British common law.25 In British common law,
aliens, those without citizen status, could not fully own real property.26
The basis of this law was the notion that those who owed no fealty, or
allegiance, to the sovereign could use land, but not own it in a fee simple
absolute manner.27 An alien could not pass the property through "de-
scent, dower, or courtesy."' 28 The theory underlying the common law
was that aliens should not be allowed to hold land with the same rights
as a monarch's subject.29 Consequently, the "monarch had the preroga-
tive to claim an alien's landholdings without compensation.... . 3 0 The
Crown then had the ultimate control of the land, thus limiting an alien's
"ownership" of the land.3 After the American Revolution and the ensu-
ing formal development of the country, many states passed laws that re-
quired Tories to relinquish their land to the state governments. 32 When
these laws were challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
25 Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-evaluation, 36 TEMp. L.Q. 15 (1962).
26 Azevedo, Foreign Direct Investment in U. Real Estate: A Survey of Federal and State Entry
Level Regulation, 7 N.CJ. IN'L. L. & COM. REG. 147 (1982).
27 Id
28 Pfeffer and Quintana, Foreign Investment in the United Stater a Nineteenth Century Perspec-
tive, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 45 (1981).
29 Lazarus, An Historical Analysis ofAlien Land Law: Washington Territory & State 1853-1889,
12 U. PUGTLr SouND L. REV. 197, 198 (1987).
30 Id.
31 "An alien's real property rights were much more limited. Under the common law, an alien
could take and hold real property against all but the Crown, but could not by deed convey that
title." Note, Alien Landownership in the United States: A Matter of State Control, 14 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 147, 150 (1988).
Two consequences resulted from this feature of the common law alien land disability.
First, land that might otherwise go to an alien by operation of law escheated to the sover-
eign unless an eligible heir of the decedent could be found. Second, untransferred land
remaining at the time of an alien landowner's death automatically escheated because aliens
were deemed to have no legal heirs.
Lazarus, supra note 29, at 199.
32 Note, supra note 31, at 151.
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adopted the British Common Law principle.3 3 Thus, aliens under U.S.
law possessed the same inability to own property as aliens did under Eng-
lish law.
After the United States became more settled, many states relaxed
their laws, giving aliens the same property rights as citizens.' At that
point, there was great concern about the development of the country,
particularly the Western frontier, which outweighed the traditional and
historical convictions about alien landholding leftover from British com-
mon law. Liberalization of landholding laws was a key component to
developing the country.35 "This [liberalization] implies greater interest
in using attractive terms of land tenure as a means of encouraging settle-
ment than as an inducement for aliens to become citizens." '36
In the nineteenth century, when immigration increased drastically,
not only did many states revert to their previous exclusionary practices,
but the Federal Government also involved itself.37 These state and fed-
eral measures, reactionary in nature, 38 were intended to protect the coun-
try from the increase of foreign investment.39 Much of the concern
focused on the ownership of farms and ranches where many foreign in-
vestors had begun developing large estates.
Opponents of foreign ownership claimed that the system of small, indi-
vidual homesteads was in peril and would be replaced by tenant farm-
ing and feudalism.... Protesters pointed to the presence of British
nobles on the boards of directors of many cattle companies and warned
of the imminent danger of a takeover of America by the British
aristocracy.
40
33 Id
34 Azevedo, supra note 26, at 28.
35 Note, State Laws Restricting Land Purchases by Aliens: Some Constitutional and Policy Con-
siderations, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 137 (1982).
36 Sullivan, supra note 25, at 30.
37 For a good discussion of immigration in the United States at this time, see 0. HANDLIN,
THE UPROOTED: THE EPIC STORY OF THE GREAT MIGRATIONS THAT MADE THE AMERICAN PEG-
PLE (1951); A. KRAUT, THE HUDDLED MASSES: THE IMMIGRANT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1880-
1921 (1982); R. EASTERLN, D. WARD, W. BERNARD, & R. UEDA, IMMIGRATION (1982).
38 'This wave of restrictive statute-making was a product of agricultural discontent.. .The
great abuse in the eyes of the farmer was the large-scale engrossment of farm land by absen-
tees... Alien landholdings were extensive.. .Alien holdings of such magnitude [farms often in excess
of one million acres] aroused much concern in farm areas throughout the country. This was under-
standable in a time of depression, mortgage foreclosure and increased farm tenancy, when prospects
for the independent farmer were especially bleak." Sullivan, supra note 25, at 31.
39 Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MINN. L. REV. 621,
625 (1976).
40 Pfeffer & Quintana, supra note 28, at 50. While the establishment of a feudal system in
America would be a tremendous undertaking, the bitter memories of serfdom, poverty, and subservi-
ence to the powerful landholder were fresher in nineteenth century then they are today. Conse-
quently, the existence of the farmers's fear of such an economic backslide is understandable, if not
plausible.
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In the late nineteenth century, Congress passed the Territorial Land Act
of 1887 which prevented all aliens who had not yet declared their inten-
tion to become naturalized citizens from purchasing land.4
In the twentieth century, the focus of alien landholding laws, some
of which are still on the books, narrowed. The Alien Property Custodian
Regulations allow the government, in the interests of national defense, to
seize alien-owned property temporarily during time of war.42 More re-
cently, Congress passed the Agriculture Foreign Investment Disclosure
Act of 1978 (AFIDA) which required disclosure, resembling that which
would be required by FODA, for agricultural interests.43 This bill was
passed for reasons similar to those behind the passage of the state agricul-
tural alien landholding laws: fear of foreign investors and absentee own-
ers.' Congress then enacted the Foreign Investment in Real Property
Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA).4 5 FIRPTA was designed to equalize the tax
differences between foreign and domestic investments, thus reducing the
appeal of foreign investment in U.S. real estate.46
Almost all of the alien landholding laws have been enacted by the
individual states. Historically, the various state laws have all reflected
the political and economic climates of the time.4 7 Increases in immigra-
tion often resulted in more stringent laws aimed at excluding aliens. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many states passed
landholding laws as a response to the influx of aliens.4" Farm states were
concerned over absentee alien landlords49 and, consequently, legislated to
limit their holdings of U.S. property."0 In the West, the laws were aimed
41 "No alien or person who is not a citizen of the United States, or who has not declared his
intention to become a citizen of the United States in the manner provided by law shall acquire title to
or own any land in any of the Territories of the United States." 48 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988). See also
Note, supra note 31, at 156.
42 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1988).
43 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (1988).
44 Most farmers were fearful that foreign investors were going to cause an upheaval in agricul-
ture which could have placed the livelihood of many rural Americans in jeopardy. "These parties
[American farmers and their representatives] testified that little was known about foreign investment
in U.S. agricultural land; that fears were developing about the connection between rapidly increasing
prices of prime U.S. agricultural acreage and investments by foreigners in U.S. agricultural acreage;
that foreigners, because they were often absentee owners, might not be as motivated as native owners
to practice soil conservation; and, finally, that foreign-based speculators might sell more readily to
developers than U.S. landowners would and thus contribute to the decrease of productive farm acre-
age in the United States." Azevedo, supra note 26, at 29.
45 26 U.S.C. §§ 861, 871, 882, 897 (1988). See also, Note, supra note 31, at 158.
46Id
47 See generally, Note, supra note 31, at 152-55.
48 Sullivan, supra note 25, at 26.
49 For a discussion of absentee landlords, see generally supra note 44 and accompanying text.
50 Restrictions vary greatly. They include prohibiting the purchasing of title, limiting the
length of leasehold estates, limiting the length of freehold estates, and restricting the amount of land
a foreigner may own. Azevedo, supra note 26, at 28, 38-47.
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at Asian nationals. 51 These anti-Asian laws, in particular those affecting
the Japanese, became quite popular prior to and during World War II as
a result of economic fears and the rise of American nationalism,52 but
they were largely repealed after the war.13
There has been a great deal of debate on whether the federal govern-
ment, as opposed to the states, should attempt to regulate the ownership
of real property. While the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution en-
ables the federal government to "entirely preempt or partially invalidate
conflicting state legislation," 4 and the Commerce Clause gives the gov-
ernment the power to regulate foreign commerce, 55 neither was specifi-
cally intended for real property transactions.5 6 A state has the inherent
power to control the "devolution of property within its territorial bound-
aries,"'57 because, historically, the federal government could not, as a
matter of practicality, reflect the geographically specific need of local
communities. 58  As shown by AFIDA, however, "[c]omprehensive fed-
eral legislation enacted pursuant to the federal power over interstate and
foreign commerce... could nevertheless 'occupy the field,' thereby pre-
empting all state legislation."' 59 This circumvents the Federal-State argu-
ment, allowing the U.S. government, as opposed (or in addition) to the
state, the power to control alien landholding.
II. CONCERNS SURROUNDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
Historically, the concern over foreign investment in the United
States either concentrated on farming, or was, especially in urban set-
51 Note, supra note 35, at 137; Note, supra note 31, at 152; Sullivan, supra note 25, at 26.
52 "[A]nti-Japanese sentiment [flourished] in the Pacific Coast states. Earlier those states had
shown concern about Chinese immigration, and had resorted to landholding restriction to a minor
extent. The Japanese not only migrated to the Pacific Coast states in large numbers after 1900, but
engaged in agricultural pursuits to a greater extent than the Chinese. They proved so efficient as
farmers that fears of competition among their citizen neighbors soon developed. When efforts to
restrict Japanese immigration failed to produce the desired effect, strong pressures developed for
legislation that would force the Japanese farmer off the land. These pressures, in which race preju-
dice and economic motives blended almost indistinguishably, centered in California." Sullivan, supra
note 25, at 32-33.
53 The Supreme Court also ruled that "alien land laws which had the effect of discriminating
solely against the Japanese, were vulnerable to attack on equal protection and due process clauses."
Note, supra note 31, at 153.
54 Note, supra note 35, at 139.
55 Note, supra note 31, at 161-63.
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (J. Madison) (reprinted in Sullivan, supra note 25, at 163,
n.104).
57 Note, supra note 31, at 177.
58 Id. at 180.
59 Note, supra note 35, at 140.
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tings, a Populist xenophobic reaction to immigration.' The laws were
intended to protect the small farmer struggling to make a living or were
the result of White America's hostility to the "newcomers," most notably
the Asians.6" However, in the past twenty years, the focus of this con-
cern has shifted. Most investment has grown dramatically, and the
targets of investment have moved away from agricultural land towards
businesses and urban real estate. Fears that foreigners are taking over
the economic centers of the country and not just the farmland have
developed.
Today, there are four major areas of concern over foreign invest-
ment. They are (A) influence on FDI policy and national security, (B)
domestic corporate behavior, (C) global monopoly, and (D) technology
transfer.62 The most important area is the first one. It centers directly
around the role the dollar can play in the field of political decision
making.
A. Influence on American Politics and National Security
Politics has long been known as an area where money talks. Foreign
investors control a great deal of money which gives them an opportunity
to control our decision makers. This concern is not unfounded. Califor-
nia and Florida both had unitary taxes. Because unitary tax is based on
worldwide sales, as opposed to sales within state boundaries, many for-
eign manufacturers did not savor the economic environment of these two
states.
Executives of Sony of America, a subsidiary of the Japanese company,
threatened both the Florida and California legislatures with cancella-
tion of plans to build facilities in their states unless the unitary tax was
repealed.... Florida complied in a hastily called session during Christ-
mas week in 1984. Sony contributed $29,000 to the election campaigns
of California legislators in 1984 in an effort to repeal the state's unitary
tax. They were abetted by a coalition of Japanese investors, who added
$108,000 to the coffers, and by European investors and their govern-
ments, who also contributed money as well as their considerable polit-
ical weight. The prime minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher,
personally lobbied the U.S. president on the issue of unitary repeal.
California finally knuckled under the pressures in 1986, when the legis-
lature repealed the unitary tax. 63
60 Huizinga, Alien Land Laws; Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Regulate, 32 HAS-
TINGs L.. 251 (1980).
61 Id
62 S. GORDON & F. LEES, FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL SUPREMACY 20 (1986)[hereinafter FOREIGN MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT].
63 M. & S. TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How FOREIGN MONEY IS CHANGING THE
FACE OF OUR NATION, 17-18 (1988)[hereinafter BUYING INTO AMERICA].
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A system of disclosure would not have been of much use in these situa-
tions, but disclosure could have revealed other investors, who would
otherwise remain anonymous to the government or who might be
tempted to influence politics. A corporation could, by all appearances,
be "American," yet, actually be owned by a foreign investor. Working
behind that "corporational" mask, that investor could then attempt to
influence a political outcome. An unwitting politician could think that
by listening to this corporation, he was answering to his voters, but this
response, for all practical purposes, would be to a foreign investor.
This scenario was nearly played out in Washington D.C., when
Toshiba pressured its American employees to lobby their politicians and
start a letter writing campaign in an effort to have the trade sanctions
against the Japanese relaxed., If large numbers of employees, respond-
ing to the wishes of management, lobbied Congress to change a law, Con-
gress might not know that these employees worked for a corporation
owned by a foreign investor whose motives might not be the same as
those of an American investor. While a foreign investor has the right to
lobby Congress, such lobbying should be done without deceit or fraud.
Otherwise, Congressional decisions could be made based on incorrect
information.
Koreans started publishing a newspaper in the nation's capital with
the express intent of changing the political climate.65 The results of this
and similar actions are tantamount to investors hiding behind a corpo-
rate name. If the publishers attempted to hide their nationality, then
Congress could misinterpret what was being written in the newspaper.
Instead of listening to the wishes of their voters, the Congressmen would
be listening to the wishes of the Korean investors.66
FDI cannot only affect national security through political pressure,
it can also directly compromise security. Foreign investment in the de-
fense industry has a frightening potential. America must be able to de-
fend itself and to do so requires a strong defense industry. If the defense
industry falters, then America's physical well-being could falter as well.
In 1987, two major investment opportunities shed light on the vulnerabil-
ity of the nation's defense. Fujitsu Limited tried to purchase a control-
ling interest in Fairchild Semiconductor, while James Goldsmith did the
same to Goodyear. The sale of these two companies to foreign investors
could have had serious ramifications if the United States went to war.
64 Fry, Foreign Direct Investment in the United State" The Differing Perspectives of Washing-
ton, D.C and the State Capitals, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 373, 385 (1989).
65 BUYING INTo AMERICA, supra note 63, at 18.
66 The Korean publishers and investors did not attempt to deceive the public as to their mo-
tives. However, their situation is useful as an example. Another example that follows this line of
reasoning occurred when the Japanese investors in an Alaskan mill played an integral role in the
defeat of the Clean Water Act through their lobbying efforts. Id. at 21-23.
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Their owners could have shut down, cut off the supply of critical parts,
and crippled a war effort. While the government could probably com-
pensate for this loss through the laws of expropriation, it might not ever
be able to recover any military secrets or technology that a foreign inves-
tor might lift from this country by virtue of his investment in a sensitive
field. This fear has, to an extent, been alleviated by the Exon-Florio
Amendment to the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988.67
B. Domestic Corporate Behavior
The behavior of domestic corporations is an immediate concern of
the American worker. Proponents of FDI maintain that over three mil-
lion workers are employed through FDI.6 The question is how those
workers are being treated. There are allegations that foreign businesses
are notoriously anti-union,69 which results in fears of worker oppression
not seen since before the Depression. While this fear may be unfounded,
disclosure would allow study of FDI employees in order to determine if
American workers are truly being exploited.
Another allegation is that the parts used in manufacturing, which
had been domestically produced while the business was American
owned, are now being imported,70 thus reducing the number of available
jobs for other American laborers. Disclosure would allow the govern-
ment to identify which businesses might be performing this practice,
bringing to its attention a problem that previously would have gone un-
discovered. At that point, Congress would have enough information and
data on which to base a decision that might affect such practices.
Other concerns have been stated. "Basic industries such as steel and
motor vehicles provide an income for a large part of the population. The
replacement of these industries with lower paid employment opportuni-
ties would lead to a serious reduction in the U.S. standard of living."71 If
the investor then flounders, will the American locations be the first to
shut down? Even if these concerns are unfounded, the question remains
of how the country is affected when the investors remove the profits of a
bought-out business and return them to the investor's home country. 2
67 Exon-Florio allows the President to void a sale of American business to a foreign investor if
that sale could jeopardize national security. However, there are still ways for a foreign investor to
avoid this provision.
68 Most of these jobs are "saved" by foreign investors rescuing floundering American corpora-
tions. An example of this is Bridgestone's buyout of Firestone Tire. Richardson, United States
Policy Toward Foreign Investment: We Can't Have It Both Ways, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 281,
293-94 (1989).
69 BUYING INTO AMERICA, supra note 63, at 27.
70 Id.
71 FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT, supra note 62, at 4.
72 Id.
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That, in itself, merits study of FDI.
C. Global Monopoly
The third concern is that competition, both domestically and glob-
ally, could be jeopardized by global monopolies. 73 If a foreign investor
were effectively to corner a market in a product, other rival American
companies could be put at a serious disadvantage competitively. This
concern, admittedly, is not as pressing as the others. As FDI grows,
though, the concern could become much more relevant.
D. Transfers of Technology
The last concern is highly controversial. By investing in American
businesses, foreign investors would be privy to America's superior tech-
nological base.
The acxuisition of U.S. technology companies by foreign state-owned
enterprises could give these enterprises an advantage that would
threaten the remaining members of the industry sector. It could also
create problems relating to the protection of national defense technol-
ogy and other sensitive sectors closely linked to national interests.74
An example of this is the Japanese investment in Boeing which brought
out fears that America might lose control of the aerospace industry.75
Critics of FDI also point to the Fujitsu offer discussed earlier. "Technol-
ogy leadership is required of a superpower. Continued leadership is not
possible unless America properly blends together research and develop-
ment (R&D), industrial investment, and policies on international trade
and investment."' 76
III. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING OWNERSHIP
Garnering vast amounts of information facilitates solving the illu-
sive issue of FD1. However, when trying to structure a system that
would reveal the scope of FDI, the question of ownership is of para-
mount importance. The concerns about foreign investment are related
directly to the actions of a corporation. When an investor has a loud
enough voice in the managerial process of a corporation, he has the abil-
ity to manipulate that investment so as to further his own desires. This
possibility mandates that attention be paid to determining what level of
investment gives the investor the ability to control a corporation. While
foreign investment has generally been considered to be direct when an
73 Ild
74 Id
75 BUYING INTO AMERICA, supra note 63, at 11-12.
76 FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT, supra note 62, at 4.
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investor has ten percent of the voting securities,77 that definition might
well need to be amended.
The concerns enumerated in the previous section possess the com-
mon thread that a foreign investor will use his investment to disadvan-
tage Americans. The decisions regarding corporate action come from
the ability to direct the course of the corporation. Because of this, those
who have the ability to control the assets of a corporation, and thereby
the course of the corporation, are the primary targets for disclosure.
While creditors may be able to exert substantial control over the use of
assets, their interests are often secondary to that of the investor. The
investor is concerned primarily with the disposition of the real assets
whereas a creditor is more interested in the financial assets. It is the
disposition of the real assets that more readily affect the concerns about
FDI. The debt market is not as important to those who are alarmed by
FDI. Consequently, the definition of ownership needs to reveal those
who can control the real assets of the corporation.
A. The Exon-Florlo Amendment
The Exon-Florio amendment to the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988
attempts to reveal those who control real assets. The Exon-Florio
amendment gives the President the authority to nullify an acquisition of
an American business if that acquisition would threaten national secur-
ity.7" Because of the need to determine which acquisitions merit atten-
tion, the Treasury Department needed to create a process that would
reveal the type of ownership that would enable the investor to engage in
the type of behavior that Congress feared. The Treasury Department
decided that the right to determine use and disposition of assets was the
crucial ownership attribute. The definition, in a proposal stage at this
point, concentrates on the word "control.1 79
The term "control" means the power, direct or indirect, whether
or not exercised, and whether or not exercised or exercisable through
the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority of the total out-
standing voting securities of an issuer, or by proxy voting, contractual
arrangements or other means, to formulate, determine, direct or decide
matters affecting the entity; in particular, but without limitation, to
formulate determine, direct, take, reach or cause decisions regarding:
(a) The sale, lease, mortgage, pledge or other transfer of any or
all of the principal assets of the entity, whether or not in the ordinary
course of business;
77 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
78 Liebeler, Foreign Investment in the U.S. After Exon-Florio, L.A. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 12
[hereinafter Exon-florio].
79 See 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744 (1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800) (proposed Jul. 14, 1989).
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(b) The dissolution of the entity;
(c) The closing and/or relocation of the production or research
and development facilities of the entity;
(d) The termination or non-fulfdlment of contracts of the entity;
or
(e) The amendment of the Articles of Incorporation or constitu-
ent agreement of the entity with respect to the matters described at (a)
through (d) above.80
This definition of control removes the mechanical aspect of the previous
definitions by simply saying that ten percent of the voting stock creates a
control problem. Restricting the definition to focus on those who invest
in a business and receive, in return, the ability to regulate or affect how
the business is run is a more realistic approach. This definition is not,
however, intended to affect more remote investments.
The fear that a foreign investor could gain ownership, that is, the
right to control the assets, of a business that could affect national security
necessitates being able to determine who controls the assets. The regula-
tion is concerned with who is able to control the corporation."1 The
question remains, though, even after § 800.213 is implemented, can the
government discover the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) behind a maze
of corporations. While the issue of the UBO has long been a thorn in the
side of those who wish to study FDI, § 800.213 circumvents the issue in
two ways. First, it examines who controls the assets and, second, it states
that such control may be either direct or indirect. By looking beyond
who owns how much stock and focusing on who is able to control the
business, the Treasury Department has seemingly created a test that
would reveal the UBO. If an investor were to shield his investment
through a maze of corporations, he would still be able control assets and
direct matters "affecting the entity."
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission
Another strategy is taken by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC). Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act requires, basically, that
the beneficial owner of five percent of stock disclose his identity to the
SEC. 2 However, the SEC zeroes in on the element of control as well. If
it appears to the SEC that the investment was made "in the ordinary
course of business and w[as] not acquired for the purpose of and do[es]
not have the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer nor
80 54 Fed. Reg. 29,751 (1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800.213)(proposed Jul. 14, 1989).
81 "[Ihe intent of the regulations is to indicate that notice, while voluntary, is clearly appro-
priate when, for example, a company is being acquired that provides product or key technologies
essential to the U.S. defense industrial base." 54 Fed. Reg. 29,746 (1989) (Comments to the
regulation).
82 15 U.S.C. § 78(M(d) (1988).
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in connection with or as a participant having such purpose of effect,"8 3
then the investment is not of concern. This test includes, unlike the test
in Exon-Florio, the identification of most types of control, including
creditors. It separates into two groups those who invest with the purpose
of simply making money and those who attempt to gain control of their
acquisition. This then identifies the UBO.
The SEC has also proposed a different form of this test. In its pro-
posed rule, anyone "who contributes more than ten percent of the equity
capital of the filing person or who, directly or indirectly, has a right to.
receive, through an ownership interest, capital contribution or otherwise,
more than ten percent of the profits or the assets (upon liquidation or
dissolution) . . ." would be required to register under the Exchange
Act."4 Although this is better than the customary ten percent of stock
test, it is not perfect. Paying attention to the capital contribution is a
mechanical approach that is similar to prior definitions. Attaching im-
portance to who puts up or receives the money assumes that immediate
financial gain is the goal of all investors. What happens if someone in-
vests in a corporation solely for the purpose of influencing American
politics? That investor may control the corporation, according to
§ 800.213, but may not have contributed capital or have rights to the
profits. This is an unlikely scenario, admittedly, but one that is possible.
IV. CURRENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Various agencies of the federal government do require some limited
disclosure. The United States does not have one all-encompassing disclo-
sure law as most other industrialized countries do. 5 There are sixteen
different governmental entities which require some sort of limited regis-
tration.86 This information is insufficient to serve as an adequate and
accurate registration of foreign investors because it tends to be incorrect
and highly fragmented across numerous governmental organizations.
The main accounting agency of the government, the General Accounting
Office (GAO), has little effective information on foreign investment.87
83 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(d)(5) (1989).
84 Disclosure of Equity Participants in Control Transactions, F. See. L. Rep. Transfer Binder
(CCH) para. 84,411 (Exchange Act Release No. 26599, Mar. 6, 1989).
85 Ironically, President Reagan, along with other western industrialized nations and Japan,
signed a recommendation by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development endors-
ing the disclosure and registration of foreign investment. "Most would report only who they are,
where they live, interest held, and the US assets' value .... ." Bryant, Let's Have Disclosure by
Foreign Investors, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 28, 1989, at 9 (discussing the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development's 1984 "Declaration and Decisions on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises").
86 Id. See also 135 CONG. RFc., supra note 11, at H9589 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement by
Rep. Bryant).
87 1 have requested an assessment by the GAO to help us so we could be more effective in
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The two agencies primarily responsible for data collection are the
Department of Commerce and the Treasury Department."8 The Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) collects data on foreign investment, but
there are many problems with the data. The data is published, often
rather slowly, in the aggregate form only 9 and is classified by industry
rather than by enterprise;' the BEA will not release the information
about individual businesses. The Treasury Department collects data
through four entities: the Office of Data Management in the Office of the
Assistant Secretary, International Affairs; the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency; the Office of Thrift Supervision; and the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS). 91 All IRS flings are confidential. 92 FIRPTA requires
annual tax filings by foreigners, but that information is also kept confi-
dential by the IRS.93 However, FIRPTA allows the use of strawmen. 4
"What good does it do to have a law on the books, as we do now, which
does not require the ultimate beneficial owner of the property be dis-
closed?"95 The other three offices collect data on portfolio, or indirect,
investment which is then published in the aggregate only and does not
reveal the UBO. The Treasury Department's benchmark surveys, from
which the data is derived, are not very timely. They are conducted every
five years.96 The Treasury Department is also part of the Committee of
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).97
The Department of Agriculture collects the AFIDA data. AFIDA
requires disclosure of foreign owners of agricultural property to the Sec-
retary of Agriculture. "Again that permits registration in the name of a
trade negotiations with Japan. After a year of study, the GAO produced a report which
read as follows. They could not give us the information we wanted on Japanese ownership
in this country because private industry was not required to provide us with the informa-
tion because of the intense competition within the industry which made it impossible to
verify much of the information that they were asked to provide.
135 CONG. REc., supra note 11, at H9584 (statement of Rep. Latta).
88 FoREIGN INvESmENT, supra note 20, at 6.
89 Rather than publishing the information by individual, it is published cumulatively so that
only the investment totals are announced. Id. at 8.
90 Id. at 7-8.
91 Id. at 13.
92 Id at 14.
93 134 CONG. REc., supra note 11, at H9585 (statement by Rep. Latta).
94 A strawman is "a person who is put up in name only to take part in a deal.... [A] person
who purchases property for another to conceal identity of real purchaser." BLAcK's LAW DICrION-
ARY 1274 (5th ed. 1979).
95 135 CONG. REc., supra note 11, at H9585 (statement by Rep. Bryant).
96 FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 20, at 14.
97 CFIUS is responsible for administering the Exon-Florio data collection procedures. CFIUS
is an inter-agency committee that was created after the Arab Oil Embargo. "CFIUS is composed of
the secretaries of commerce, state, and defense; the attorney general; the U.S. trade representative;
the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; the director of the Office of Management and
Budget and the treasury secretary, who serves as its chairman." Exon-Florio, supra note 78, at 14.
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dummy corporation .... ,g Additionally, there have been compliance
problems with foreign-owned land being unreported. 99
The SEC requires reports on owners, as previously discussed. How-
ever, since this requirement is applicable only to publicly traded corpora-
tios, it does not include many other investments, such as equity
purchases in private businesses and real estate acquisitions.
The Census Bureau collects proprietary business data on businesses
in the United States, but does not emphasize foreign investment. Fur-
thermore, this data is also confidential."o°
The Office of Trade and Investment Analysis publishes a list of for-
eign investment in the United States based upon compilations of news
stories. However, because of errors in collection, the publication carries
with it a disclaimer of responsibility. 101
One of the results of this sketchy and erratic data collection scheme
is that errors easily occur and multiply." 2 With the current process
provided for disclosure and registration, very little accurate and depend-
able information is obtainable. The Foreign Ownership Disclosure Act
strives to increase the accuracy, timeliness, and dependability of the data.
V. THE FOREIGN OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1989
A. A History of the Bill
The purpose of the Foreign Ownership Disclosure Act is to provide
the government with "a centralized and reliable source of data regarding
the rapid increase in foreign ownership of U.S. farms, banks, factories,
corporations, and Government securities."103 With that knowledge,
Congress, theoretically, should be able to make intelligent and thoughtful
98 135 CONG. REc., supra note 11, at H9589 (statement by Rep. Bryant).
99 FOREIGN INvEsTmENT, supra note 20, at 10-11.
100 Id. at 9. "The Census Bureau collects, on a computerized file, detailed but proprietary
business data on the operation of most U.S. domestic and foreign-owned businesses. Census data
contain detailed individual establishment information (such as individual factories), but does not
highlight foreign-ownership ..... Id.
101 Hearing, supra note 1, at 26-27 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
102 1 made the point... that data [required by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the
Commerce Department], which is thick and which does look good, basically tell us very
little. Why? Because they permit foreign investor under the current practices to hide be-
hind dummy corporations by not requiring a list of the ultimate beneficial ownership. Be-
cause their data is admittedly, by their own accounting, unreliable, they have a $223 billion
discrepancy between what they claim in writing has been the extent of foreign ownership in
America and what they admit is the fact as to currency inflows.
134 CONG. Rac. 140, H9589 (statement of Rep. Bryant) (Rep. Latta had, previously in the debate,
proffered a copy of a Commerce Department report regarding the International Investment and
Trader in Services Survey Act. He described the report as being "about a half an inch thick." ML at
H9585 (statement of Rep. Latta)). See also Hearing, supra note 1, at 25, 27 (statement of Rep.
Bryant).
103 135 CONG. REC., supra note 21.
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decisions regarding FDI. FODA should also help to reveal whether or
not foreign investors are attempting to influence political opinion. Pro-
ponents of the bill argue there is insufficient data currently because of the
inadequate and nonsystematic process for registration and disclosure.
H.R. 5410, the Foreign Ownership Disclosure Act, takes a crucial
first step in understanding the circumstances surrounding the huge in-
flux of foreign capital into our country. By requiring the registration
of large acquisitions by foreign nationals, we can begin to grasp the
extent of their participation in the American economy. And, in the
case of a foreign person owning a controlling interest in an American
enterprise, it is not too much to ask to receive a copy of the same
relevant documents which that national's own country requires dis-
closed. It is very important that this information be reported to the
Congress and the President as the bill requires.... Such disclosure in
situations of foreign ownership has at least three functions:
First, to identify additional interested parties, including where
"front men" and collusive activity are involved,
Second, to indicate our vulnerability to particular lenders within
specific industries or sectors of our economy; and
Third, to identify ownership within the United States which could
be made possible by involvement in illegal activities, such as drug
trafficking.1
0 4
FODA "would establish the first systematic registry - accessible only to
policymakers and legitimate researchers - of major foreign investment
in the United States.""0 5 With it, Congress should possess a precise ana-
lytical foundation on which to make public opinion."
FODA was originally introduced by Texas Congressman John Bry-
104 Id at H9594 (statement of Rep. Collins). (H.R. 5410 was the Foreign Ownership Disclo-
sure Act of 1988 which is very similar to FODA of 1989. FODA of 1988 was passed by the House
on October 5, 1988, but died when the Senate was unable to act upon it before the end of the session.
Hearing, supra note 1, at 29-30 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
105 135 CoNG. RFc. supra note 2, at E1366 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
106 Our current policy of ignorance handicaps our ability to responsibly manage our own
economy. We don't have enough information to even know most of the questions we
should be asking, but I will venture to suggest a few I believe we ought to be equipped to
answer.
First question. Is there a line beyond which it is not in our economic interest to have
foreign ownership of a particular industry? Does foreign control in that industry beyond
some point begin to endanger our national security?...
Second question. How much foreign influence is taking place in the American electo-
ral process? How do we guard against the funneling of campaign contributions in to U.S.
political campaigns anonymously from abroad, as we know happened during President
Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign?...
Third question. When is foreign investment creating jobs and when is it displacing
them? When is it increasing opportunities for U.S. businesses and when is it shutting them
out?
Hearing, supra note 1, at 28.
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ant as an amendment to the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988.107 It passed
the House of Representatives but was dropped as an amendment because
of strong Presidential opposition.108 In its place was inserted the Exon-
Florio Amendment, a provision which authorized the President to stop a
takeover by a foreign investor if that takeover threatened national secur-
ity in some manner." 9 However, the Exon-Florio amendment applies
only to transactions whose participants notify the government. Such no-
tification is totally voluntary.11 ° FODA was then reintroduced in the
House and passed by a vote of 250 to 170 (with 11 not voting).1 II The
Senate was unable to act on the bill before the end of the Congressional
session and, consequently, the bill died. Representative Bryant intro-
duced FODA of 1989 at the beginning of the next Congress.112 Later in
the month, Senator Harkin introduced the same bill in the Senate. Both
Houses of Congress have sent the bill to committee.'1 I The Senate Com-
merce, Science and Transportation Committee held a hearing on the bill
on July 11, 1989.114 FODA already has strong support in the House
since the House has passed it twice before.' 1
5
107 Hearing, supra note 1, at 26-29.
10 Both the current and immediately preceding administrations feel that FODA would dis-
courage foreign investment and provide little new information. 135 CONG. REC., supra note 11, at
H9582 (statements of Rep. Bryant and Rep. Latta). See also Hearing, supra note 1, at 29-30 (state-
ment of Rep. Bryant).
109 Hearing, supra note 1, at 30 (statement of Rep. Bryant). "mhe President may take such
action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition,
merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States proposed or
pending on or after the date of enactment of this section by or with foreign persons so that such
control will not threaten to impair the national security." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988).
110 Exon-Florio, supra note 78, at 15. The element of voluntary compliance is a striking differ-
ence from FODA. While the information disclosed would be similar, FODA would also reach be-
yond the scope of Exon-Florio and would include FDI that does not threaten national security.
111 H.R. 5410, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 135 CONG. REc. 140, H9581, H9607 (daily ed. October
5, 1988).
112 135 CONG. REC., supra note 21.
113 1989 H.R. 5 (Jan. 3, 1989); 1989 S. 289 (Jan. 31, 1989)(LEXIS, LEGIS. library, Archiv.
file).
114 Hearing, supra note 1, at 29-30.
115 FODA of 1989 currently lists sixty-seven cosponsors. They are, in addition to sponsor Rep-
resentative Bryant, Bonior (D-MI), Chapman (D-TX), Evans (D-IL), Frost (D-TX), Gaydos (D-
PA), Leath (D-TX), Lukens (R-OH), Edwards (R-OK), Coleman (D-TX), Kaptur (D-OH), Herger
(R-CA), Martin (R-IL), Eckart (D-OH), Jontz (D-IN), Boxer (D-CA), Gephardt (D-MO), Tallon
(D-SC), Johnson (D-SD), Gonzalez (D-TX), Bilbray (D-NV), Durbin (D-IL), Valentine (D-NC),
Lipinski (D-IL), Pelosi (D-CA), Traxler (D-MI), Morrison (D-Cl), Olin (D-VA), Smith (D-FL),
Atkins (D-MA), Akaka (D-KI), DeFazio (D-OR), Clay (D-MO), Lantos (D-CA), Collins (D-IL),
Vento (D-MN), Luken (D-OH), Glickman (D-KS), Kildee (D-MI), Mfume (D-MD), Wolpe (D-
MI), Hughes (D-NJ), Sangmeister (D-IL), Walgren (D-PA), Penny (D-MN), Roth (R-WI), Faun-
troy (D-DC), Roe (D-NJ), Donnely (D-MA), Ford (D-MI), Parker (D-MS), Bentley (R-MD), Lan-
caster (D-NC), Bates (D-CA), Long (D-IN), Dorgan (D-ND), Oberstar (D-MN), Sikorski (D-MN),
Williams (D-MT), Pallone, Jr., (D-NJ), Kanjorski (D-PA), Poshard (D-IL), Campbell (D-CO),
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L Lo
B. Explanation of the Bill
FODA is a relatively simple bill in its construction. It is set up as a
broad blanket to cover all foreign investment, above the specified lim-
its.'16 The bill requires that all foreigner investors" 7 who acquire a sig-
nificant interest"" in a United States property" 9 disclose, within thirty
days, to the Secretary of Commerce the following information:
(1) The identity, address, legal nature, industry and nationality of
the foreign person.
(2) The date on which the foreign person acquired the interest.
(3) The relation of the foreign person to the United States
property.
(4) The name, location, and industry of the United States
property.
(5) The market value of (a) the assets of a United States business
enterprise or (b) a United States real property.
(6) The percentage size of the interest acquired. 120
All foreigners who have a controlling interest 12' in a business enterprise
must also disclose:
(A) a-
(i) balance sheet and income statement;
(ii) statement of changes in financial condition;
(iii) statement of sales, assets, operating income, and depreci-
ation by industrial segment... ;
Wise (D-WV), Borski (D-PA), Sabo (D-MN), English (D-OK). Mead Data Central Tracking Re-
port, 1989 H.R. 5 (Jan. 31, 1989).
116 For the specified limits, see infra note 118.
117 A foreign investor is defined as (1) any individual who is not a citizen of the United States,
(2) any business organized under foreign laws (or any business whose principal place of business is
outside of the country), or (3) any foreign government. Furthermore, "foreigners" extends to "any
two or more [foreign] persons acting as a group for the purpose of acquiring or holding any interest
[described later]." Anyone who falls into groups (1), (2), or (3) above "[who] hold[s] an equity or
ownership interest in such group [whose purpose is acquiring or holding any previously described
interest] of twenty percent or more, or the equivalent of such an interest" must report. This is to
prevent the use of strawmen. H.R. 5, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(m)(5), 135 CONG. Rac. 1, E4, E5
(daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989); S. 289, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(M)(5), 135 CONG. REc. 8, 5854, S857
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1989) [hereinafter, citations will be only to the House bill (H.R. 5), unless there is
a difference in the Senate bill (S. 289)].
118 A "significant" interest is any equity or ownership interest over five percent of the total
value for property that has assets (or in the case of real property, is valued) over $5,000,000, or has
gross sales in excess of $10,000,000. Id. § 2(m)(6).
119 "Property" is defined as any American business or real property. Id. § 2(m)(4).
120 Id. § 2(C).
121 A "controlling interest" is any equity or ownership interest in excess of twenty-five percent
of the total equity or ownership interests of a busines whose assets are greater than $20,000,000,
based upon "fair market value," or who has a gross sales total larger than $20,000,000. Ia
§ 2(m)(7).
Vol. 23:593
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE ACT
(B) the location of all facilities within the United States; and
(C) the identity and nationality of each director and executiveOffiCer. 122
This additional disclosure for foreign investors holding controlling inter-
ests must be made only if the foreign person's home country requires
such additional public disclosure of him as well. 123 The bill would also
require this information to be updated yearly.124 After the bill is enacted,
the Secretary of Commerce will report to Congress and the President
detailing the foreign investment in this country made possible by the re-
porting requirements of this bill. 125 The Secretary will also prepare a
registry of interests reported 126 to be made available only to those work-
ing pursuant to this law, the committees of Congress, the General Ac-
counting Office, applicable state agencies, and anyone performing
"qualified research" as determined by the Secretary. 127 Failure to com-
ply with this act would result in a maximum fine of $10,000 and/or a
122 Id. § 2(d)(2).
123 Id. § 2(d)(1).
124 Id. § 2(e).
125 The Secretary shall transmit in June of each year, beginning in 1989, a report to the Presi-
dent and the Congress describing
(1) the extent to which foreign persons hold significant or controlling interest in
United States properties, the nationality of those foreign persons, the industries in which
those interests are concentrated, and the social, economic, and other effects in the United
States of such foreign interests;
(2) the effectiveness and efficiency of the registration and reporting requirements con-
tained in this section providing the information required under this section and the extent
to which the information provides a comprehensive description of the presence of foreign
capital in the United States economy;
(3) other Federal data collection activities that overlap with, duplicate, or comple-
ment the registration and reporting requirements established under this section and that
could be consolidated or eliminated without compromising the quality of the data col-
lected; and
(4) in the case of the first annual report, the feasibility of establishing a system to
track individual transactions representing other capital flows into the United States.
Id § 2(k).
126 'The registry shall index the information for retrieval by:
(A) the name and nationality of any foreign person who registers or reports an inter-
est. . . and the standard industrial classification number or numbers (as issued by the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget) of any such foreign person; and
(B) the name of the United States property in which any interest registered or re-
ported under this section is held, the standard industrial classification number or numbers
of any such United States property, and the State in which any such United States property
is located.
Id § 2(l).
127 Id. This is the main difference from FODA of 1988. FODA of 1988 did not provide for
such limiting of access to the reported information. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 34 (statement of
Sen. Harkin).
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maximum sentence of one year in jail. 128  Repeated failure to comply
would result in forfeiture of the interest. 129 Perhaps the most important
provision is the investigative powers conferred to the Secretary of Com-
merce who may do anything necessary, under the Federal Trade Com-
mission guidelines, to monitor compliance with this Act. 130  When
combined with the provision requiring disclosure of the UBO, FODA
becomes a powerful tool to discover exactly what pieces of American
property foreign investors own.
C. Analysis of the Debate Over the Bill
There are two factions arguing over FODA. Those who are against
the bill feel that it will hurt the U.S. economy by discouraging and dis-
criminating against foreign investment. They claim that the current re-
porting requirements give the United States all the information necessary
to analyze foreign investment. Those who are in favor of FODA feel that
it is necessary to learn how much foreign investment there is in the
United States and, based on other countries' experiences, feel that it will
not discourage any foreign investment. The Netherlands,' 3 ' West Ger-
many,1 3 2 Canada, 13 3 Australia, 134 France, 135 and Japan 136 all have some
128 H.R. 5, supra note 117, § 2(h)(1).
129 Id § 2(h)(2).
130 Id. § 2(i).
131 The Netherlands, along with West Germany, is among the most liberal industrialized na-
tion toward foreign investment. CONGRESSIONAL ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP INST., AMERICAN As-
SETS: AN EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1988) [hereinafter
AMERICAN ASSETS]. It is also the second largest country with foreign direct investment in the
United States. Id at 3. There are no major governmental restrictions to foreign investment; in fact,
the Dutch government actually provides incentives to foreign investors with a goal of promoting
"specific economic goals." Id. at 20 (quoting AMERICAN EMBASSY, INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATE-
MENT FOR THE NETHERLANDS (1987)). However, in lieu of governmental restrictions, the nature of
Dutch business practices act to protect against hostile takeovers. Id
132 As one of the strongest industrialized nations of Europe, West Germany monitors foreign
direct investment. The West German government has the broad power to restrict foreign investment
should it chose to do so. However, it rarely chooses to exercise that power. AMERICAN ASSETS,
supra note 131, at 23. The government does require, though, that direct investments in excess of
DM 100,000 be reported to the Federal Office of Economics; investments in excess of DM 400
million must be referred to the Cartel office for registration. Id. The government will only release
aggregate information, protecting the identity of the investor. Department of the Treasury, Survey
of G-7 Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment: Foreign Direct Investment Reporting
and Disclosure Requirements of the Group of Seven Countries 2 (Dec. 7, 1988) [hereinafter G-7
Laws].
133 The Canadian government closely monitors foreign investment. The agency Investment
Canada requires that all investments in over $5 million (Canadian) be screened. AMERICAN ASSETS,
supra note 131, at 22. It is then possible for Investment Canada to impose restrictions that may
affect the amount of acquisition, the production techniques, and the transfer of technology. Id. The
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement will prohibit most performance requirements for American in-
vestors. Currently, investment from Canada ranks fourth highest on the list of countries from which
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controls over foreign investment. While some controls are quite liberal,
such as those of the Netherlands, others are very restrictive, such as
those of Japan. In the United States, though, the lack of systematic dis-
closure system means a lack of quality information. "T]here is simply
no way for us to tell which foreign businesses are buying American
stocks, bonds, real estate, businesses, manufacturing plants, and our na-
foreign direct investment comes. Id at 3. However, this will not take place until the current agree-
ments expire, no later than 1996. Id at 22.
The information gathered by Investment Canada is then published. While "sensitive!' financial
data is not disclosed, the information is published in specific lists. G-7 Laws, supra note 132, at 2-3.
Furthermore, the Corporations and Labor Unions Returns Act requires that the ownership of com-
panies that issue stock be made available to the public. Id The governmental agency Statistics
Canada requires some reporting as well, but releases the information on in the aggregate form. Id
134 Australia has strict foreign investment rules. All investments over $10 million (Australian)
must be pre-approved, as do foreign takeovers involving more than $5 million (Australian) or fifteen
percent of the ownership, and all urban real estate acquisitions valued in excess of $600,000 (Austra-
lian). AMRImcAN AssETs, supra note 131, at 23. Approval is then based on, among other factors,
"industry-specific restrictions" which limit foreign involvement in a particular industry. Id
135 The French government, while professing to encourage foreign investment subjects invest-
ment to governmental approval. AMEmcAN Ass , supra note 131, at 24-25. "France's Ministry
of the Economy and Finance reviews foreign investment projects to the extent that they first, import
new technologies; second, stimulate exports; third, benefit the regional economy, and fourth, create
jobs. Approval for most project takes about two months." Id at 25. The government then main-
tains a registry of foreign direct investment, but it is closely held within the government. G-7 Laws,
supra note 132, at 2. However, the government does publish aggregate information. Id.
136 The Japanese are among the most stringent when it comes to foreign investment.
The Japanese require every prospective foreign investor to submit a report, through
the Bank of Japan, to the Ministry of Finance and any other relevant ministries. Potential
investors must then wait 30 days before proceeding with their investment plans. Some-
times the waiting period is shortened to 15 days; if the authorities wish to conduct a more
detailed investigation, the investor may have to wait up to five months for a decision.
AMEPJCAN AssETs, supra note 131, at 21.
The government then has the authority to reject an investment if it would (1) ad-
versely affect national security interests, (2) adversely affect a Japanese business engaged in
a similar effort, or (3) might "disrupt the smooth performance of the Japanese economy.
Id Furthermore, a hostile takeover may be rejected because of the government requires "100 per-
cent approval by the targeted firm's Board of Directors." Id (quoting Mr. Richard Heimlich, the
Vice President and Director for International Strategy of Motorola).
Additionally, foreign investors in Japan face relentless pressure. This may range from the obvi-
ous, governmental pressure to transfer large amounts of technology to the Japanese partner in a joint
venture, to more subtle pressure. Id T. Boone Pickens, who invested in Koito Manufacturing, was
routinely stonewalled by company management. Hearing, supra note 1, at 107-25 (statement by Mr.
T. Boone Pickens, Chairman of Boone Company). As the largest shareholder in Koito, Pickens
requested representation on the board of directors equal to that of Toyota's. Id at 109 (Pickens'
venture bought 32.4 million share of Koito, roughly 20.2 percent of the stock. Toyota was the next
largest shareholder with 19.2 percent). At the annual shareholders meeting, they were denied their
request, but Matsushita Electronics, a five percent stockholder, received one seat. Id at 112-13.
As far as disclosure is concerned, the Japanese government will release individual foreign direct
investment information, as long as the investor has not previously requested confidentiality. G-7
Laws, supra note 132, at 3. Beyond that, only aggregate information is readily available. Id
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tional debt. There's a frightening lack of information on foreign invest-
ment and it's an elusive issue which could come back to haunt us." 137
FODA attempts to take the first step toward assembling data in one
place, in an effort to accurately analyze foreign investment.
The United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation held a hearing on both FODA and S.856, a proposed
amendment to the International Investment and Trade in Services Sur-
vey Act. 138 At that hearing, the Department of Commerce Under Secre-
tary for Economic Affairs, Mr. Michael Darby, who is opposed to
FODA, outlined the current major reporting requirements in the United
States.139 He noted that the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), super-
vised by the Commerce Department, collects data on foreign direct in-
vestment in the United States."4
The BEA's collection is done by surveying all the "U.S. affiliates of
foreign companies."' 41 There are four surveys conducted by the BEA.142
However, this information is difficult to utilize.
Under the International Investment and Trade in Service Survey
Act, the data from BEA surveys are confidential. No one with access
to the data may publish them or make them available to the public in a
manner that would specifically identify the company furnishing the in-
formation or tha [sic] would disclose the data of an individual com-
pany. The penalty for willful disclosure is a $10,000 fine. 14 3
Even if the information were available for specific use, such as "persons
performing qualified research,"'" it is inherently flawed; it is possible to
137 135 CONG. REc., supra note 11, at H9603 (statement by Rep. Gaydos).
138 Hearing, supra note 1.
139 Id. at 55 (testimony of Mr. Michael Darby).
140 Id. at 57.
141 "A U.S. affiliate is defined as a U.S. business enterprise in which a foreign person owns or
controls, directly or indirectly, at least 10 percent of the voting securities (or the equivalent interest
in an unincorporated business enterprise)." Id.
142 The four surveys are (1) Foreign Direct Investment Position and Balance of Payments
Flows, which measures the flow of capital, income, fees, and royalties; (2) U.S. Business Enterprises
Acquired or Established by Foreign Direct Investors, which is designed to track the yearly outlay of
foreign investors to establish or acquire new U.S. affiliates; (3) Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States: Operations of U.S. Affiliated of Foreign Companies, whose main purpose is to gauge
the value of total assets of U.S. affiliates; and (4) Benchmark Survey of Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States, which covers the entire scope of foreign direct investment data. FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT, supra note 20, at 6-7.
143 Hearing, supra note 1, at 59. In addition to the problem of confidentiality, critics find fault
with the data because (I) it is collected on an enterprise level, rather than an establishment level; (2)
it is classified at a very rudimentary level, which hides important industry sectors; and (3) the publi-
cation often runs up to two years late. FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 20, at 8-9.
144 H.R. 5, supra note 117, § 2 (I)(2)(E).
Vol. 23:593
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE ACT
"hide" ownership by the use of strawmen.1 45 Mr. Darby feels that the
BEA information is sufficient for the United States. He states that not
only would FODA reveal no additional worthwhile information, but it
would act to discriminate against foreign investors. Such discrimination
would then generate a decrease in foreign investment." s
Congressman Byrant disagrees with the contention that reporting
would discourage investment. Legitimate foreign investors, he claims,
are here to make money. Simple reporting, as would be required by
FODA, would not frighten away any investor. "They [foreign investors]
will not find a more open investment climate anywhere in the world.
Why would simple disclosure stop them from investing here, if much
more onerous requirements have not stopped them and Americans from
investing abroad?"147
Mr. Darby's contention that FODA is discriminatory is not so eas-
ily dismissed. In fact, other opponents to the bill have expressed the
same concern. The Chairman of the Association for Foreign Investment
in America points out that Section 2(a)-(d) would treat foreign investors
differently than domestic investors. "The establishment of a public regis-
try [as opposed to a confidential registry, such as that of the IRS] for
foreign investors, and only for foreign investors, is discriminatory per
se." 148 The National Association of Manufacturers agrees.
It [FODA] discriminates against foreign investors, since it would
require foreign persons and companies in many cases to disclose a wide
range of important and propriety business information that U.S. com-
panies in like circumstances are not required to provide or disclose.
The U.S. business community and the U.S. government have opposed
discriminatory reporting requirements and investment policies in other
countries, because they are frequently used to hamper both trade and
the efficient management of international business enterprises. 149
Congressman Bryant, while not directly refuting the accusation of
discrimination, looks towards the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) and its 1984 "Declaration and Decisions
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises" which calls
for foreign-owned companies to "register and publish" the same informa-
tion which would be required under FODA. 10 The United States is a
145 Hearing, supra note 1, at 75 (Questions of the Chairman and the Answers Thereto by Mr.
Darby).
146 Id. at 61 (statement of Mr. Darby).
147 Id. at 28 (statement of Rep. Byrant).
148 Id. at 163 (statement by Mr. Elliot Richardson, Chairman of the Association for Foreign
Investment in America).
149 Id. at 90-91. (statement of Mr. Jerry Jasinowski, Executive Vice President and Chief Econ-
omist of the National Association of Manufacturers).
150 Id. at 28 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
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signatory to the OECD declaration; "in other words, the United States
government has agreed in the international community to the very dis-
closure that first the Reagan Administration and now the Bush Adminis-
tration so vigorously opposes." 151 As long as other industrialized nations
require disclosure, and as long as the United States may have supported
such an idea in the past, Congressman Bryant and his supporters seem to
feel that the implications of possible discrimination are lessened. 52
When this consideration is coupled with the emotional part of the issue,
both historically, given the context of American xenophobia, and cur-
rently, given increasing concern over just how vast the range of recent
FDI in the United States is, the fear of discrimination is apparently ren-
dered moot. 153
The contention that the breadth of the information to be revealed is
too large is countered by examining the current reporting system. The
current system is simply inadequate.
We as Members of Congress are denied access on BEA data on
individual investments, but look at the BEA people themselves.
My staff found that the BEA employees handling this data on
individual investments are not even cleared. They do not even have a
security clearance, and yet those of us who get security clearances who
have access to the most secure information of the United States Gov-
ernment, we cannot get the data.
But the BEA employees themselves who get it do not even have a
security clearance. They are just simply told every day, do not divulge
the data. What kind of sense does that make?15
Though there is a fair amount of disclosure required for FDI, there re-
151 Id.
152 There is a clear justification for disclosure of multinational business operations - in
the very document that upholds the "principle of national treatment.... [the Declara-
tion] states that multinational companies are complex organizations, with often circuitous
links between offshore affiliates and the corporate parent. We find that "advances made by
multinational enterprises in organizing [sic] their operations beyond the national frame-
work may lead to abuse of concentrations of economic power and to conflicts with national
policy objectives. In addition, the complexity of these multinational enterprises and the
difficulty of clearly perceiving their diverse structures, operations, and policies sometimes
give rise to concern." Foreign companies are called on to register with the host nation and
supply much more information that the United States presently requires.
Ia at 205-06 (statement of Dr. Douglas Woodward, Professor of Economics, University of South
Carolina, quoting The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 1986, at 11).
153 In the coming years, Congress will increasingly hear emotional appeals to restrict for-
eign investment from people who fear it or oppose it. We will hear other emotional appeals
to promote and subsidize foreign investment from people who are desperate for financial
assistane.... It would be highly irresponsible of us to consciously remain in the dark as
public concern continues to mount. We need reliable information, and we need to get it
into the hands of the numerous researchers inside and outside of government on which
Congress relies for the analytical base on which to make responsible public policy.
Id at 29 (statement of Rep. Bryant).
154 Id at 43 (statement of Sen. Harkin).
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mains no single uniform system for registering FDI, one of the major
reasons for the inadequacy.
As often happens in Washington, D.C., Congress has avoided some
of the truly substantive issues surrounding FODA. The process that at-
tempts to define ownership is suspect. The test is limited to a mechanical
examination of ownership. Furthermore, ownership is never truly de-
fined. It is vaguely described as "equity or ownership interest."' 15
5
FODA needs to be revised so that it clearly defines which ownership
interest is truly of concern. As a basic registration system, FODA is
concerned with identifying who possesses enough equity in a corporation
so as to be able to direct its actions. The concerns of foreign investment
all point to the control of a corporation's assets. By creating a system of
registration that needs the information necessary to determine whether
or not any of these concerns is truly valid, who controls the corporation
is the crucial piece of data. FODA is not specific enough to obtain that
vital piece of information.
The Exon-Florio amendment to the Omnibus Trade Act also seeks
to determine who controls a corporation (though Exon-Florio is ulti-
mately more concerned with matters affecting national security). Its pro-
posed test for ownership is infinitely more useful than FODA's. By
avoiding the mechanical examination of securities ownership and, in-
stead, consciously focusing on the element of control, the Exon-Florio
test would obtain the identity of the UBO. Therefore, a revision of
FODA which would incorporate the Treasury Department's ideas
should be seriously considered by the sponsors of the bill.
An alternative to incorporating the ideas set forth in Exon-Florio
would be to incorporate the strategies of the SEC. One of the benefits of
these approaches is that the SEC rule provides for the identification of
other types of control. Since the major worries focus on the control of
assets, the Exon-Florio test should be sufficient. However, if Congress
felt that other possible controllers, such as creditors, could inspire anxi-
ety over FDI, then a test such as the SEC's should be considered. Also
absent from the debate is an argument over the definition of foreigner.
The definition as it exists would appear to be a thorough and workable
definition.' 56 However, it is inadequate when it tries to define those for-
eign investors who hide behind a veil of businesses. It seeks to define the
UBO as someone who owns at least twenty-five percent of a strawman
business. This business then holds the legal (and equitable) title to the
investment. The investor of record would then be the strawman busi-
ness, not the individuals behind it. An investor could, theoretically, cre-
ate a multi-level strawman investment which eludes the definition of
155 H.R. 5, supra note 117, § 2 (M)(6).
156 See supra, note 117 and accompanying text.
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foreigner. 157 Consequently, the disclosed owner would be a strawman.
This problem could be avoided by implementation of an inquiry similar
to either the SEC's or Exon-Florio's. Either test goes beyond the first
level of a corporate veil by their emphasis on control and the use of the
"direct or indirect" language. By removing the mechanical tests and re-
placing them with more flexible ones, fewer loopholes should be available
to the rogue foreign investor who wishes to preserve his anonymity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proponents of FODA stress the importance of knowledge. As
Congressman Bryant pointed out at the Senate Hearing, 158 Congress
does not currently have the information necessary to adequately formu-
late questions about foreign investment. Once Congress has enough data
to assess the scope of foreign investment, it can use that new-found
knowledge to make more intelligent decisions regarding all economic
matters which are affected by foreign investment.
The extensive ignorance about foreign direct investment is the great-
est deterrent to the passing of FODA. Because so little is really known,
debate over the bill has been painfully superficial. Before this bill can be
passed, revisions must be made. Its most crucial element, that of defining
who needs to register, is flawed. Its current framework is vague. Such
ambiguities could easily remove any teeth the law might have. If Con-
gress were to tighten the definition, ideally following the Treasury De-
partment's lead, then FODA would be a stronger, more compelling
concept. FODA would then be able to expose those who control the
businesses being bought by foreign investors. Identification of those who
control the corporations constitutes the most serious concern.
In addition to the apparent semantic flaws of FODA, opponents of
the bill still raise other logical objections. FODA's detractors feel it
would discourage foreign investment but they are wrong. Most investors
spend their money in the United States because of the chances for profit-
ability. Revealing basic information is not enough to scare away a seri-
ous investor; it merely becomes part of the process of investing. The
claim of discrimination is not as easily discarded because of its emotional
aspects. However, there appears, based on the OECD, to be a general,
worldwide consensus that registration does not constitute discrimination.
Additionally, the knowledge that would be gained by registering foreign
investments far outweighs any minor discriminating effects. In a global
157 Consider the following scenario: The investor of record is a strawman business that itself is
owned by five equal businesses, thus falling below the twenty-five percent floor. The five equal busi-
nesses could themselves be owned by the same individual investor, who is, in effect, the single owner
of the initial investment.
158 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Vol. 23:593
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE ACT
economy, growing broader and more complex every day, it is absolutely
necessary to have the ability to examine the economic infrastructure of
the country. Without knowing who owns what in America, the concerns
and fears of FDI may easily come about.
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